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ANTITRUST-THE DEFENSE OF In Pari Delicto--A NEW "BUT FOR"
STANDARD-Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276. (9th Cir.
1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite past declarations that the defense of in pari delicto is dead
in antitrust cases,' parties continue to assert the defense under its own
name or under some other label and the lower courts continue to rec-
ognize the defense in certain circumstances. The perseverance of this
defense results from the Supreme Court decision in Perma Life Muf-
flers v. International Parts Co.'
The Ninth Circuit has ruled on the validity of in pari delicto on
very few occasions, 3 and thus has remained in the background with re-
spect to the continued efforts of the courts to resolve the ambiguities
of the Perma Life decision. It appears, however, that by its recent de-
cision in Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc.4 the Ninth Circuit has now
come to the forefront, being the first of the circuits to establish its own
standard, independent of Perma Life, for determining whether a plain-
tiff in a private antitrust suit may recover. Although the Javelin decis-
ion contains many of the same inconsistencies which have accompanied
the application of the in pari delicto defense since the Perma Life de-
cision, the standard which it sets forth is likely to have a significant im-
pact on the use of the in pari delicto doctrine as a defense in private
antitrust litigation.
This note will examine the role which the in pari delicto doctrine
played in antitrust litigation prior to the Perma Life decision, discuss
the effect which Perma Life has had on the status of the defense, and
explore the nature and likelihood of its continued application as it re-
lates to the antitrust laws5 in light of the Javelin decision.
1. See, e.g., Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 688-89
(9th Cir. 1976); Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 362 F. Supp. 54, 62-64 (D. Ore.
1973); Schokbeton Prod. Corp. v. Exposaic Indus., 308 F. Supp. 1366, 1369 (N.D. Ga.
1969); Morton v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 287 F. Supp. 753, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1968),
aff'd, 414 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006 (1970).
2. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
3. See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976);
Dreibus v. Wilson, 529 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1975).
4. 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976).
5. The term "antitrust laws" refers to the provisions of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970 & Supp.
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II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The uncertainty concerning the vitality of the in pari delicto defense
stems from two principal sources. The first is the tension that exists
between two equally strong but conflicting aspects of public policy.
The courts are faced with balancing the public interest in encouraging
private enforcement of the antitrust laws against the public interest in
seeing that the courts do not become the instruments of wrongdoers,
and more specifically, the notion that a wrongdoer should not be as-
sisted in profiting from his wrongdoing. The second source is the fail-
ure of the courts to acknowledge the real meaning of the term in pari
delicto and to adequately distinguish it from other similar equitable de-
fenses such as unclean hands, consent and illegality.6
V 1975), the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1970) and the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) prohibiting the
restraint or monopolization of trade. The principal antitrust laws are the Sherman Act
and the Clayton Act.
Sections 1 and 2 are the key provisions of the Sherman Act. Section 1 provides in
part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or en-
gage in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1 to 7 of this title
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall
be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any
other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975). Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975).
6. The term "in pari delicto" means "of equal fault." The doctrine of in pari delicto
is a common law principle which was originally applied in contracts cases. Where the
parties participated equally in the illegal or fraudulent contract and were equally at fault,
the court would generally not aid the plaintiff unless compelled by statute to do so. How-
ever, where the parties were not in pari delicto, the court of equity would give relief
to the one who was comparatively innocent, and the parties were said to be in partliceps
criminis. According to Pomeroy, not being in pari delicto meant that "both have not,
with the same knowledge, willingness, and wrongful intent, engaged in the transaction,
or the undertakings of each are not equally blameworthy." 3 J. PoMmioY, EQITY
JtRSPRUDENCB § 942 (5th ed. 1941). There was, however, an important limitation on
the principle: even where the contracting parties were in par! delicto, the courts would
interfere on behalf of the plaintiff in some circumstances where the contract was against
public policy, as in the case of usurious contracts. Id. § 941.
For an explanation of the unclean hands doctrine, see note 17 infra. Consent refers
to a situation in which the plaintiff does not commit an offense himself, but knowingly
allows an offense to be committed against him. The defense of illegality is a challenge
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A. Public Policy Considerations
The principal remedy available to private parties injured by viola-
tions of the antitrust laws is the private treble damage action.7  The
chief functions of this action are to (i) provide redress for those injured
by antitrust violations; (ii) prevent loss or damage to others (by provid-
ing injunctive relief); (iii) serve as a deterrent to those contemplating
violations; and (iv) provide a force of private investigators to supple-
ment the Justice Department's efforts at law enforcement.8 The prin-
cipal arguments advanced on behalf of the in pari delicto defense are
directed primarily to the deterrent rationale of the statute and its unjust
enrichment aspects. Proponents of the defense argue that optimal de-
terrence results where the plaintiff's fault is small compared with de-
fendant's, but that where the parties' fault is more nearly equal the
treble damage statute actually encourages rather than deters illegal
conduct because the plaintiff knows that he can engage in discrimina-
tory or monopolistic practices and still collect treble damages from a
co-conspirator when the situation gets out of hand.' Furthermore, they
question whether the public derives any benefit from allowing the
plaintiff to recover damages in addition to retaining the fruits of his
illegal participation in the scheme. They claim, as did Justice Harlan
to the plaintiff's right to bring the action on the ground that his business is illegal and
therefore he has no legal right which can be protected. See Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943); Blackford, "Business or Property" Entitled
to Protection Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 26 MERCER, L. REV. 737, 742-44
(1975); Note, In Pari Delicto: The Consumer's Best Friend, 30 OHIo ST. L.J. 332, 340
(1969).
7. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing foridden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
The other remedy available to private parties is injunctive relief under section 16 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). Antitrust violators are also subject to single
damage suits by the government under section 4A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15a
(1970); criminal proceedings under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp.
V 1975); and government proceedings in equity under section 15 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970). See ANTrTRusT ADvisOR § 2.4 (C. Hills ed. 1971).
8. 13 J. VON KALiNowsKi, ANTITRUSr LAWS & TRADE REGULATION § 99.03 (1976).
The policy of encouraging private suits is evidenced by the fact that the statutory provi-
sions entitle private plaintiffs to use as prima facie evidence decisions in prior government
suits based on the same alleged acts, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970); and by the provisions
for recovery of attorneys' fees. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
9. Ellis, In Defense of In Par Delicto, 56 A.B.AJ. 346, 347-48 (1970). See also
Comment, 46 ILL. I REv. 654, 662 (1951).
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dissenting in Perma Life, that this is a "bizarre way to 'further the over-
riding public policy in favor of competition' . . to pay violators three
times their losses in doing what public policy seeks to deter them from
doing.'
10
Another argument in favor of the defense is that the court, by strik-
ing defendant's affirmative defense rather than allowing it to be proved
at trial, is doing more than granting the plaintiff a right to maintain
his cause of action; many times the court is essentially paving the way
for the plaintiff's recovery even before a hearing on the merits."
From the plaintiff's point of view, however, it would seem that permit-
ting the defense effectively denies the plaintiff the right to prove any
damages he actually suffered.
Opponents of the defense make four principal arguments. They
urge that when the Sherman Act 2 was introduced in Congress, alter-
native antitrust bills expressly granting the in pari delicto defense were
rejected. This suggests that Congress did not intend that the defense
bar recovery."1 They also note that allowing the defense would permit
two wrongdoers to go free rather than only one since there is no assur-
ance that any action would be brought against either of the parties by
the government or by injured third parties.14 The opponents also as-
sert that the deterrent theory is sound even if the plaintiff is equally
at fault because the plaintiff has no assurance that his co-conspirator,
the government or a third party won't bring an action against him be-
fore he has a chance to sue for treble damages.' 5 Finally, it is posited
that a value judgment was made at the inception of the antitrust laws
that the public interest in furthering competition far outweighed any
10. 392 U.S. at 154.
11. See, e.g., Purex Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 318 F. Supp. 322 (C.D. Cal.
1970), in which the court summarized the balancing process as follows:
This court is mindful that it should be slow to grant motions to dismiss affirm-
ative defenses. A defendant should be given the opportunity to prove his allega-
tions if there is any possibility that the defense might succeed after full hearing
on the merits.
Id. at 323. Motions to strike affirmative defenses are not favored and may only be
granted if the insufficiency of the defense is clearly apparent. If there are either ques-
tions of fact or disputed questions of law, the motion must be denied. Carter-Wallace,
Inc. v. Riverton Laboratories, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 366, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 &Supp. V 1975).
13. Bushby, The Unknown Quantity in Private Antitrust Suits-The Defense of In
Pari Delicto, 42 VA. L. Rev. 785, 787 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Bushby].
14. Trebuhs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595, 600 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
15. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
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equitable considerations between the parties, and Congress has not
seen fit to amend the laws to provide for such a defense. 16
Although the arguments against the in pari delicto defense appear
to be much stronger than those in favor of it, there may be some basis
for argument that the common law doctrine has not effectively been
abolished in antitrust litigation because there have as yet been no cases
where the parties have been found to be truly in par! delicto.
B. Judicial Misapplication of the Doctrine
Some courts now consider in pari delicto to be identical to or part
of the unclean hands doctrine. 17 There is a distinction between the
two doctrines, however, which is important in the context of this dis-
cussion. That distinction is one of degree. To be in pari delicto the
plaintiff must be of equal fault with the defendant in the transaction
sued upon; however, the unclean hands doctrine requires that the plain-
tiff be a participant in the illegal transaction, but not to the extent of
being equally responsible in the formation or execution of the illegal
activity.'
8
Since the importation of the two doctrines into antitrust law as affir-
mative defenses, however, an erroneous distinction between the two
doctrines has emerged. An antitrust plaintiff is now said to have un-
clean hands if he is guilty of some misconduct unrelated to the matter
in litigation, and which may or may not involve the defendant.' 9
16. Bushby, supra note 13, at 800. Bushby points out that although the government
has stressed the importance of antitrust suits it has never (so far as had been ascer-
tained) filed an amicus brief in a private antitrust suit on the issue of the in pari delicto
defense, nor has it urged Congress to legislate on the subject. Id. at 798-99.
17. "Unclean hands" is a shorthand expression for the maxim that he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands. Although in general it means that the courts will
not interfere on behalf of one who in his prior conduct has violated good faith or
other equitable principles, Pomeroy, in his treatise on equity, emphasizes one im-
portant limitation on the doctrine: it is confined to conduct which -is connected with
the matter in litigation and with which the opposing party is concerned. "The dirt upon
[plaintiff's] hands must be his bad conduct in the transaction complained of. If he is
not guilty of inequitable conduct toward the defendant in that transaction, his hands are
as clean as the court can require." 2 J. PoME.oY, EQurry JURiSPRUDENCE § 399 (5th
ed. 1941). See also Note, Antitrust-The Defenses of Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands,
29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1463, 1464 (1954); Note, In Par! Delicto: The Consumer's Rest
Friend, 30 Onto ST. LJ. 332, 339 (1969).
18. See Comment, Limiting the Unclean Hands and In Pari Delicto Defenses in Anti-
trust Suits: An Additional Justification, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 456 (1959); Note, Antitrust
-The Supreme Court's Rejection of In Pari Delicto as a Defense, 3 VAL L. REv. 234
(1969).
19. This is the sense in which the term "unclean hands" is used in this note. See
1977]
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Prior to Perma Life some courts found a plaintiff to be in pari delicto
by virtue of his participation (of whatever degree) in the illegal scheme
for which he was suing the defendant.20 In other courts he was con-
sidered to be in pari delicto only if he was equally responsible with
the defendant in the formation of the illegal conspiracy.21
These distinctions in the quality of the conduct of the plaintiff arose
as an attempt to measure the logical nexus between the plaintiff's al-
leged wrongdoing and the matter in litigation in order to determine
whether the plaintiff's participation was so great as to bar his recovery.
For example, if the wrongdoing alleged by the defendant is unrelated
to the plaintiff's claim, it does not meet the requirements of the in pari
delicto doctrine and can therefore be summarily disposed of by the
court. 2 Only where the'plaintiff is charged with some misconduct con-
nected with the transaction being litigated is it necessary even to in-
quire into the quality of the plaintiff's participation. The court must
then consider stch factors as the nature and extent of the participation,
whether the plaintiff consented to the transaction on which he is suing,
and if so, whether his consent was voluntary or amounted to economic
coercion.23
generally Comment, Limiting the Unclean Hands and In Par! Delicto Defenses in Anti-
trust Suits: An Additional Justification, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 456 (1959); Note, Rethink-
ing In Pari Delicto: An Antitrust Policy Analysis, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 360 (1975).
20. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec., Light &
Power Co., 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954); cases cited
note 23 infra.
A reasonable explanation for the willingness of the early courts to allow the defense
on less than a showing of equal fault is that since the antitrust laws were relatively new,
the policy of promoting their private enforcement had not yet begun to balance the well-
established common law policy that one should not be allowed to profit from his wrong-
doing. Moreover, since growth of business was encouraged at this stage of the country's
industrial development, there were relatively few antitrust suits by the Justice Depart-
ment, which meant that it was able to enforce the antitrust laws without the help of
private parties. However, in the 1930's, as trusts became more powerful and their unfair
practices more difficult to detect, it became apparent that the most effective way to en-
force the antitrust laws was through the private treble damage action by persons who
were directly affected by the violations, and that allowing the defense of in par delicto
not only defeated the purpose of the laws by allowing the defendant to escape liability,
but also deprived the plaintiff of his right to seek redress for injuries suffered.
21. See cases cited note 23 infra.
22. For a good discussion of this distinction, see Pennsylvania Water & Power Co.
v. Consolidated Gas, Elec., Light & Power Co., 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. de-
nied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954).
23. The pattern which evolved in the early antitrust cases was that the defense was
allowed in two groups of cases: (1) those in which the plaintiff actively participated
in initiating and organizing the same illegal scheme that caused his damage, see, e.g.,
Tilden v. Quaker Oats Co., 1 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1924); Bluefields S.S. Co. v. United
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The concern over the status of the in pari delicto defense and the
debate as to the wisdom of applying it to bar a plaintiff's cause of action
developed in the 1950's following the Supreme Court's decision in
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 4 That case up-
held the right of a wholesale liquor dealer to prosecute an antitrust ac-
tion against the defendants for setting maximum wholesale prices for
liquor despite evidence that the plaintiff was a party to an illegal agree-
ment setting minimum retail prices for liquor.25  Although Kiefer-Ste-
wart contained no explicit reference to either the doctrine of in pari
delicto or unclean hands (or the policy of the antitrust laws), it has
come to stand for the proposition that the doctrine of unclean hands
is inapplicable to antitrust actions.1
6
It is apparent that part of the problem the courts have experienced
with the in pari delicto doctrine is due to their improper characteriza-
tion of some other defense as in pari delicto. In many cases where
Fruit Co., 243 F. 1 (3d Cir. 1917); Morny v. Western Union Tel. Co., 40 F. Supp.
193 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); and (2) the "small dealer" cases in which the plaintiff became
a party to the illegal scheme as a result of economic coercion, see, e.g., Eastman Kodak
Co. v: Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Northwestern Oil Co. v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792
(1944); First Nat'l Pictures, Inc. v. Robison, 72 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 293
U.S. 609 (1934); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, 277 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1921).
To establish economic coercion, the plaintiff traditionally had to show that the alter-
natives available were so undesirable as to make dealing with the defendant amount to
compulsion. However, under Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), a plaintiff
need now show only loss of an economic opportunity. See Perma Life Mufflers v. Inter-
national Parts Corp., 392 U.S. at 155 (Harlan, I., dissenting).
A diagram of the various doctrines that are related to in pari delicto in terms of the
parties' relative fault might look somewhat like this:
unclean economic particeps in pari
hands coercion consent criminis delictoI I I I I
completely participa- voluntary partici- co-initiator
separate tion w/ participa- pation w/ equally
transaction defendant tion with defendant responsible
w/ defendant but only defendant but not
or 3d party to avoid but not a initiator
economic co:initiator
loss
24. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
25. See Bushby, supra note 13.
26. See Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 108 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); Trebuhs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
See also 13 VAN KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS & TRADE REGULATION § 109.02 (1976);
Bushby, supra note 13.
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the defendant raises a defense of illegality27 the court associates it with
in par! delicto, attaches that label to it and then proceeds on the author-
ity of Perma Life to dispose of it accordingly. As soon as the label
of in pari delicto is attached to the defense, attention is diverted from
the real conflicting policies to be balanced (antitrust policy against the
equities between the parties) and the focus shifts to the common law
principle that one should not be allowed to profit from his wrongdoing.
Before reaching the merits, the court preliminarily weighs the relative
fault of the parties and determines that the defense must be stricken,
either because the plaintiff is not in pari delicto (and therefore the de-
fense is inapplicable) or because he is in pari delicto but a "fastidious
regard for the relative moral worth of the parties would only result in
seriously undermining the usefulness of the private action as a bulwark
of antitrust enforcement." 8
III. THE Perma Life DECISION
The debate over the vitality of the in pari delicto defense was
sparked anew by the Supreme Court's decision in Perma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corp.2 9 The plaintiffs in Perma Life oper-
ated Midas Muffler shops under franchise agreements with defendants,
manufacturers of automobile mufflers and exhaust system parts. Cer-
tain terms of the franchise agreements prevented plaintiffs from pur-
chasing from other sources and from selling outside of designated ter-
ritories, tied some products to the sale of others, and fixed resale prices.
Plaintiffs alleged that these provisions constituted illegal restraints of
trade. Defendants asserted that plaintiffs had enthusiastically sought
the franchises with full knowledge of the restrictive provisions and,
moreover, that plaintiffs had profited from the arrangement.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the
ground that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the doctrine of in pari
delicto,30 and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 31 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the common law doctrine of in pari delicto was
"not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action. 3 2  Justice
Black, in the plurality opinion, pointed out that there is no indication
27. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defense of illegality is to be
pleaded affirmatively. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
28. 392 U.S. at 139.
29. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
30. See id. at 135-36.
31. 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967).
32. 392 U.S. at 140.
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in the 'antitrust acts that Congress intended its application to treble
damage actions and that even if the defense did exist, it was not appli-
cable to the facts before the Court.33 Justice Black's frequently quoted
opinion reflecting the views of only three other justices,3 4 was based
exclusively on considerations of the public policy favoring private en-
forcement of the antitrust laws.35
Despite its broad language, the Perma Life decision did not resolve
the question of the applicability of in par! delicto in 'antitrust cases.
The four concurring justices agreed with the result based on the facts
of the case but expressed support for the defense in appropriate cir-
cumstances. Justices White and Marshall favored the denial of recovery
where the plaintiff and defendant were "substantially equally respon-
sible" for the plaintiff's injuries. 36 Justice Fortas was of the opinion
that in pari delicto has a significant but limited role in antitrust law,
and suggested that under the facts presented, plaintiffs should be bar-
red from recovery only on those portions of the agreement which they
actively sought and initiated.3 7  Justice Harlan, with Justice Stewart
concurring in part and dissenting in part, thought that where there was
substantially equal responsibility between the parties, in pari delicto
should be available as a defense except where the plaintiff was coerced
into entering the illegal agreement. Justice Harlan emphasized the
need for maintaining a proper distinction between the terms "in pari
delicto," "consent" and "unclean hands" and suggested that, correctly
used, the term "in pari delicto" referred to a defense that should be
permitted in antitrust cases.3
The Court was ostensibly attempting to carry out the congressional
intent to prevent the importation of traditional common law doctrines
into the purely statutory field of antitrust law. The Court stated that
"[t]here is nothing in the language of the antitrust acts which indicates
33. Id. at 138.
34. In addition to the principal opinion, joined in by Justices Douglas, Brennan and
Chief Justice Warren, there were three concurring opinions, by Justices White, Fortas
and Marshall, and an opinion by Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Justice Stewart.
35. The Court stated:
The plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be no less morally
reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further the
overriding public policy in favor of competition. A more fastidious regard for the
relative moral worth of the parties would only result in seriously undermining
the usefulness of the private action as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement
392 U.S. at 139.
36. Id. at 143, 145, 148-49.
37. Id. at 147-48.
38. Id. at 153-55.
19773
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that Congress wanted to make the common law in pari delicto doctrine
a defense to treble-damage actions."39 In the view of the majority, ac-
complishment of the objectives of the antitrust laws requires a complete
disregard for the equities between the individual parties. 40
If, as the Court suggests, Congress did not intend that the antitrust
laws be weakened by the application of broad common law defenses,
then surely Congress could not have intended that the law be diluted
by any other defenses consisting of the same elements, but with differ-
ent names. It seems clear that the intent of the Court in Perma Life
was to abolish from antitrust law only the label of in pari delicto, not
the underlying concept of equal fault. This is the only reasonable con-
clusion that can be drawn from the contradiction which exists between
the Court's express holding and its statement in the succeeding para-
graph of the opinion. The Court's statement of the holding is un-
equivocal: "We therefore hold that the doctrine of in pari delicto, with
its complex scope, contents, and effects, is not to be recognized as a
defense to an antitrust action. 41 In the following paragraph the Court
states: "We need not decide, however, whether such truly complete
involvement and participation in a monopolistic scheme could ever be
a basis, wholly apart from the idea of in pari delicto, for barring a plain-
tiff's cause of action .... ,,41 Assuming that the application of the
common law doctrine of equal fault (in pari delicto) would undermine
the policies of the antitrust laws, on what basis can it be argued that
the concept of equal fault under some other name and of some other
origin would have a different result?
The language of Perma Life indicates that the Supreme Court used
the term "in pani delicto" in a very broad sense. The Court noted that
"[a]lthough in pari delicto literally means 'of equal fault,' the doctrine
has been applied, correctly or incorrectly, in a wide variety of situations
in which a plaintiff seeking damages or equitable relief is himself in-
volved in some of the same sort of wrongdoing." 43 The Court did not
make it clear whether it considered a plaintiff who was only "involved"
in the wrongdoing, but not equally responsible, to be in pari delicto.
If the Court did use the term "in pari delicto" to refer to a broad range
of participation or involvement, then, translating the Perma Life decis-
ion into common law terms, what the Court really held was that a plain-
39. Id. at 138.
40. J. VAN CsE, UNDERSTAIwNG THE ANTTusr LAws 101 (1973).
41. 392 U.s. at 140.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 138.
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tiff who only has unclean hands will not be barred from maintaining
an action, but a plaintiff who is truly in pari delicto probably will be
barred should such a case ever arise.
If, on the other hand, the Court used the term "in pan delicto" in a
narrow sense, to refer only to a situation in which the plaintiff is equally
at fault with the defendant, then the Court must have held only that,
should a case arise in which the plaintiff and defendant are equally at
fault, then the plaintiff will probably be barred, but the defendant will
have to furnish another name for the defense he raises.
The courts which have been faced with the task of interpreting Perma
Life are divided on the question of whether an equally culpable plaintiff
should be allowed to recover. The obvious reason for the split among
the circuits is the difference in the way they have interpreted the mean-
ing of the term "in pan delicto" as it was used in Perma Life. Some
courts have taken Perma Life at face value and have indicated an in-
tention not to allow any in pari delicto type defense.44 Some of these
same courts, however, have indicated a willingness to consider the
plaintiff's participation in determining damages.
45
Courts taking a narrow view of the holding of Perma Life basically
follow the view expressed by the Seventh Circuit in Premier Electrical
Construction Co. v. Miller-Davis Co.46 that Perma Life held "only that
plaintiffs who do not bear equal responsibility for creating -and estab-
lishing an illegal scheme, or who are required by economic pressures
to accept such an agreement, should not be barred from recovery
simply because they are participants."' 7  Relying heavily on the lan-
guage of the concurring opinions in Perma Life, these courts and sev-
eral commentators have vigorously defended the continued application
of the doctrine in situations where it can be shown that the plaintiff
44. See Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975); Hunt v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Fairfield Cty. Beverage Distribs. v. Nar-
ragansett Brewing Co., 378 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1974); Schokbeton Prod. Corp. v.
Exposaic Indus., Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1366 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Morton v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 287 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 414 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006 (1970).
45. Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
46. 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
47. Id. at 1138. Cases following this view are Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster
Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971); General Beverage Sales Co.-Oshkosh v. East Side
Winery, 396 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Midway Enterprises, Inc. v. Petroleum
Marketing Corp., 375 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1974).
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voluntarily participated in the illegal scheme from the outset and was
equally responsible for carrying out its objectives.48
Implicit in the decisions of those courts which have limited Perma
Life to its facts is the assumption that the Supreme Court intended to
abolish from antitrust law only the label of in pari delicto and not the
underlying concept of equal fault as a bar to recovery. Justice White
pointed this out in his concurring opinion in Perma Life when he
stated: "I also agree that the in pari delicto defense in its historic for-
mulation is not a useful concept for sorting out those situations in which
[a plaintiff should be barred from recovery]. Judgments like these
would be better made by hewing closer to the aims and purposes of
section 4 of the Clayton Act . . . ,,49 Surprisingly, the courts seem
to have given very little thought to this important aspect of the Perma
Life decision. This view has been expressly articulated in few cases.
In Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.,50 for example, where defend-
ants claimed that the plaintiff actively sought the territorial restrictions
of which it complained, the court stated:
What the [Perma Life] opinion implies is that the common law
doctrine of in pari delicto is inappropriate to antitrust actions. If a
defense of the plaintiff's participation and involvement is to be raised
in a private antitrust suit, then it must be a defense fashioned by
the nature of the statutory causes of action themselves, rather than
a defense lifted from a pre-existing doctrineY 1
The Dobbins court held that the defense of plaintiff's complete par-
ticipation and involvement does exist, although not as the doctrine of
in pari delicto.
IV. JAVELIN CORP. V. UNIROYAL, INC.
Prior to the Javelin decision, the Ninth Circuit had considered the
in pari delicto issue only twice since the Perma Life decision. In
Dreibus v. Wilson,5 2 decided in 1975, the court upheld the district
court's dismissal of a suit for failure to state a claim on the ground that
the allegations of the complaint itself showed that the plaintiffs were
the persons responsible for the establishment of the exclusive dealer-
48. See Ellis, In Defense of In Pari Delicto, 56 A.B.A.J. 346 (1970); Note, In Pari
Deliclo: The Consumer's Best Friend, 30 OHIO ST. LJ. 332 (1969).
49. 392 U.S. at 143.
50. 362 F. Supp. 54 (D. Ore. 1973).
51. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
52. 529 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1975).
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ship which was the basis of their antitrust claim. The court cited with-
out discussion Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. Miller-Davis Co.
53
and Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co.54
In February 1976 the Ninth Circuit decided Calnetics Corp. v. Volks-
wagen of America, Inc.,15 in which the plaintiff charged defendants
with monopoly and conspiracy to exclude plaintiff from competition.
Defendants contended that plaintiff had been a party to an illegal com-
mission agreement with an employee of one of the defendants and that
the sales resulting from that agreement should not be used as a basis
for calculating plaintiff's damages.
The Ninth Circuit viewed defendants' illegal sales contention as a
type of in pari delicto or unclean hands defense.58 Defendants claimed
that their defense was not a challenge to Calnetics' right to bring an
antitrust action because of its participation in the illegal commission
agreement but was simply a challenge to plaintiff's right to use the sales
made during the existence of the illegal agreement as a basis for prov-
ing its damages. The court, however, failed to see any distinction, par-
ticularly since the whole contention centered around the illegal agree-
ment. Basing its rejection of the defense on Perma Life and citing
in addition two subsequent cases rejecting similar illegality defenses,57
the court held that Calnetics was entitled to recover damages actually
suffered even though its previous market position had been attained
only through illegal conduct.58
On the basis of only two decisions, it would be difficult to attribute
to the Ninth Circuit any specific position on the in pari delicto issue.
After its decision in Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc.,5 9 however, there
can be no doubt as to the court's position. The Javelin case indicates
that the Ninth Circuit has chosen not to struggle with the uncertainties
53. 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
54. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
55. 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976).
56. Id. at 688.
57. Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1972) (unlicensed
dealer in new cars sued auto dealers association for interference with business efforts);
Purex Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 318 F. Supp. 322 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (cause of action
acquired by virtue of illegal acquisition).
58. 532 F.2d at 689. It was generally held, prior to Perma Life, that profits realized
during the time of participation in the illegal activity could not be used as a measure
of damages, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, 277 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1921), but that dam-
ages incurred subsequent to withdrawal from participation could be recovered, Victor
Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271 F. 810 (3d Cir. 1921). See Note, In Pari Delicto
and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1241 (1965).
59. 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976).
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of Perma Life, but has established its own standard for measuring the
relative fault of the parties in an antitrust action.
Javelin involved a tire wholesaler and distributor (Javelin) who, in
1967, joined a group of tire distributors (Tire Brands, Inc.) five years
after the group was formed. Members of the group were required to
buy a certain quota of tires from Uniroyal, one of the founding mem-
bers, and were assigned exclusive territories. Within a year after join-
ing the Tire Brands group, Javelin became very successful and began
marketing its own brands of tires which resulted in a steady decline
in the number of tires it purchased from Uniroyal. Because of its fail-
ure to maintain the quota, Javelin was expelled from Tire Brands in
1972. Javelin then brought an action against Uniroyal and Tire Brands
in federal district court alleging antitrust violations. 60 The district court
granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that Javelin
was in pari delicto,6' and Javelin appealed.
The Ninth Circuit first discussed the approaches that have been
taken by some of the other circuits in dealing with the in pari delicto
defense since Perma Life. It noted the Fifth Circuit position of disal-
lowing the defense and the position of the Fourth, Sixth and Seventh
Circuits that some participation in the formation of the conspiracy would
bar a plaintiff's recovery.
The court opted for the more liberal approach, stating that
[w]e agree that under certain circumstances a plaintiff may be barred
from recovery, but believe that the mandate of Perma Life and the
policy behind it demand that such circumstances be rare, and limited
to where a plaintiff participated in the formation of the conspiracy.02
On this basis the court held that "[a] plaintiff is barred from recovery,
only when the illegal conspiracy would not have been formed but for
the plaintiffs participation."6 3 The court explained that under its "but
for" test, the degree of plaintiff's participation "must be equal to that
of any defendant and a substantial factor in the formation of the con-
spiracy. ' '6
4
60. Javelin claimed that the assignment of exclusive sales territories was a conspiracy
and that the requirement that members buy stock in Tire Brands as a condition of mem-
bership was a tie-in agreement, all in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975). 546 F.2d at 278.
61. The in pari delicto defense was asserted by defendants only after the district court
indicated that it would grant summary judgment on that basis. 546 F.2d at 278.
62. Id. at 279.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id.
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Applying the "but for" test to the facts before it, the court found
that Javelin had not participated in the formation of the Tire Brands
group and in fact had not become a member of the group until five
years after its formation. On these facts the court had no difficulty
concluding that "under the standard we set forth above, this degree of
participation falls well short of barring Javelin's cause of action."'65
In adopting the "but for" standard, the court purports to follow the
mandate of Perma Life and the policy behind it. It indicates that the
standard will further the policy of the antitrust laws by placing a heavy
burden on the defendant to prove the plaintiff's equal participation.
Certainly the Ninth Circuit does follow the mandate of Perma Life
by its establishment of the "but for" standard. It recognizes and em-
ploys the concept of equal fault and simply discards the common law
label of in pari delicto. The Javelin court expressly states that
"[tihe instigator of an illegal scheme clearly is barred under this
test."66 It is submitted that the "but for" standard is nothing more than
the in pari delicto doctrine in its purest form. The test is the same:
establishing equal fault and determining plaintiff's degree of participa-
tion still involve the process of weighing the relative fault of the parties.
The Javelin court agrees with Justice White, concurring in Perma Life,
that the "problem of who is entitled to recover is one of degree of re-
sponsibility posing 'the issue of causation in particularized form.' ",67
However, even viewing the issue as one of causation, the moral element
associated with the in pari delicto doctrine is not eliminated. It is still
present in the court's determination to bar a plaintiff at all, regardless
of the standard applied.
It seems that the real question is not whether the plaintiff should
be barred under the "but for" standard or the in par! delicto doctrine,
but whether he should be barred at all. As noted above, the Javelin
court expressed the belief that its test was consistent with the policy
of the antitrust laws. It noted that the plaintiff sues as a "private at-
torney general" and that the courts should encourage this function.68
But is the "but for" standard really any more consistent with the policy
of the antitrust laws than the doctrine of in pari delicto? Under the
narrow interpretation which has been given to Perma Life by Javelin
and the cases cited therein, the answer is clearly that both standards
65. Id. at 280.
66. Id. at 279.
67. Id. at 279-80 n.3.
68. Id. at 279-80.
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are consistent with that policy: the "but for" standard by virtue of the
fact that it is not a moralistic common law doctrine such as that con-
demned in Perma Life, and the in pari delicto standard because (1) it
has lost its moralistic connotation in antitrust law, (2) it is not as broad,
in its true form, as the defense rejected by Perma Life, and (3) it is
identical to the "but for" standard in all material respects.
V. CONCLUSION
The supposed abolition of the common law doctrine of in par! delicto
as a defense in antitrust litigation appeared at first, and still appears
to many, to be based on the premise that accomplishment of the pur-
poses of the antitrust laws requires a complete disregard for the equities
between the individual parties. The courts, however, are placing the
utmost importance on the degree of the parties' participation in and
responsibility for the illegal transaction. A re-examination of the
Perma Life decision reveals that it was not the inquiry into the relative
fault of the parties which the Supreme Court objected to, but the im-
portation into antitrust law of broad common law barriers to suits which
Congress wished to encourage. Although this theory of Perma Life
has seldom been articulated in subsequent cases, it is implicit in the
decisions such as Javelin which hold that a plaintiff who is a co-equal
in the conspiracy will be barred. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a test
called the "but for" standard which is indistinguishable from in pari
delicto, and yet does not go against the Supreme Court's mandate in
Perma Life. Thus, it appears that the doctrine of in pari delicto, by some
name, if not its own, is likely to play a definite role in antitrust litiga-
tion until Congress expressly provides litigators with an alternative de-
fense.
Susan Thompson
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